解密器修正
This commit is contained in:
1
.gitignore
vendored
1
.gitignore
vendored
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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/target
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/target
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CLAUDE.md
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CLAUDE.md
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/docs
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/docs
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test_live.sh
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274
src/feistel.rs
Normal file
274
src/feistel.rs
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
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//! Feistel byte decryptor
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//! Corresponds to feistel_decrypt_next_byte @ 0x8004d4c1
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//!
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//! Each byte is decrypted through:
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//! 1. Feistel state update (ROL-based mixing)
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//! 2. S-Box A lookup on byte_counter (4 nibbles → inv → fwd)
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//! 3. S-Box B key derivation from rotated 0x8262a2877387e56c
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//! 4. Combined XOR with rotated 0xc4e52cd2e80e33b7
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//! 5. Anti-tamper polynomial hash → output byte
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const KEY_CONST: u64 = 0x8262a2877387e56c;
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const MIX_CONST: u64 = 0xc4e52cd2e80e33b7;
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const FINAL_XOR: u32 = 0x0e80eca9;
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// ── S-Box table extraction ──────────────────────────────────────────
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const fn u64s_to_bytes(vals: [u64; 32]) -> [u8; 256] {
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let mut out = [0u8; 256];
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let mut i = 0;
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while i < 32 {
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let v = vals[i];
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out[i * 8 ] = (v & 0xFF) as u8;
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out[i * 8 + 1] = ((v >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
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out[i * 8 + 2] = ((v >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8;
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out[i * 8 + 3] = ((v >> 24) & 0xFF) as u8;
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out[i * 8 + 4] = ((v >> 32) & 0xFF) as u8;
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out[i * 8 + 5] = ((v >> 40) & 0xFF) as u8;
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out[i * 8 + 6] = ((v >> 48) & 0xFF) as u8;
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out[i * 8 + 7] = ((v >> 56) & 0xFF) as u8;
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i += 1;
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}
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out
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}
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// Table A forward (offset 0x00..0xFF, first load in decompilation)
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static SBOX_A_FWD: [u8; 256] = u64s_to_bytes([
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0x9ed15953c4cca4b6, 0x7aa6141967d5c621, 0xdc9783ea6c0e3fe7, 0x2bd2e6b13728c7b9,
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0xc55a41435e40bbeb, 0x4e6039525b008151, 0x1094755c8890642a, 0x8f8d0aae1723707c,
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0xfddf042465e5c08a, 0xbf1ecaf3275fd376, 0xf085f9302f46d8b7, 0xc820456d7fff22b4,
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0x34e05529f1963d1b, 0xde018c871de9b2f6, 0x6bcf7405ad4ccbfe, 0x79ac151af2d7c19f,
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0xe3f466913a07a561, 0xa033fc036818809d, 0x35c2b5d9fb317d9b, 0xf5ede247efa2b3e8,
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0x3bba9358be5dc9d4, 0x1f631202849289a3, 0x0678ce82ec1c0dee, 0x11b0a72d6a38db2c,
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0x9c6efa624a1669d6, 0x509ac3420f6fab95, 0xf799cd57f8567726, 0xafda4fdda84b0c3c,
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0x2ee473b825327244, 0x0b864971e18e3ea9, 0x09bc4d9813bd8ba1, 0xaa7b54d036487e08,
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]);
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// Table A inverse (offset 0x100..0x1FF)
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static SBOX_A_INV: [u8; 256] = u64s_to_bytes([
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0x38565c35fe1b267e, 0x5f1123e743599f52, 0x0e087f546582a3e6, 0x37c10fc2fb7cbc45,
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0x3b16d7d1e1001e24, 0xaff9978a493a86a0, 0x5aeb9068acfdea95, 0xf410426eda04dfa8,
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0xb61283dc84755b53, 0xceefff6009c5150a, 0x92eea4fa31b44ff0, 0x48aea157bb622719,
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0x702f9e170cc388f6, 0xba4146816a7bb08b, 0x3e5d638da7d5dee3, 0x7d1a07b9b501f122,
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0xd01f7844e46d403c, 0xc76461766cbf6b5e, 0x7a96aa4ded8c21be, 0x73f8b703ec6f8e74,
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0xcb55982db1d3a966, 0x718f91ddd402add8, 0x673f139a72b89d50, 0x93d920140dd2e539,
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0xcfc04e2a79283369, 0xcaa29b2ea5f32505, 0x4afc99c451184bf2, 0x2c941d3658a6e034,
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0xcce2f7b30bbde8e9, 0x8777db8085292bc6, 0xd632c989cd474c9c, 0xb206f5c8301cab3d,
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]);
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// Table B forward (second load, overwrites stack)
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static SBOX_B_FWD: [u8; 256] = u64s_to_bytes([
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0x5e63857d691096e3, 0xf5b29f30c1bce088, 0x6ca3117a3571ff48, 0x9abe3a1273b08ee6,
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0xdcdbf2e88a26900f, 0x588d282e554f9ddd, 0x566e221899549b84, 0xcab786d861cb47e7,
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0x193677c5f7dead8b, 0x31d4bafd333b9823, 0xe40a08392af36221, 0x5d42721afbe25f0e,
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0x75ecbd44ce529ee5, 0xa5ea4e04383ef4d7, 0xc60c166acc1fd540, 0xd6150bae7fd3b951,
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0x651e7cfe9703c4f6, 0x00141dee607be979, 0x6409c91ca927f1a6, 0x8f252c9ca0c86d59,
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0x6f508c02f8d217af, 0xa71b95a24d68132d, 0xc2bf4a4b5c6b6780, 0x43d057a487c7492f,
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0xed5beffacf058134, 0x3c7076660193b5ac, 0xc00d2b5aab24b8e1, 0xdf3fa832bb5391aa,
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0x37b3c307d106b1f9, 0x45f082fc89da8392, 0xa19478b4294c20eb, 0x3d7e74b6cd4146d9,
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]);
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// Table B inverse (offset 0x100..0x1FF, second load)
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static SBOX_B_INV: [u8; 256] = u64s_to_bytes([
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0x10253c0ac9a9ccfa, 0xca0dd5e4675bcf42, 0x4fcb2ca86b979a49, 0x55a3b2991803929e,
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0x4b3aea77df22e90b, 0x3b1f83a77f580628, 0xfb204001da0c4182, 0x9d433e95ddb16991,
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0xd48d768af82ea600, 0x686ec25609a41d87, 0x441eb3887565cead, 0xcdf17eaae1e6af79,
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0x8027987c3108fcb6, 0x3872ded2156c52e2, 0xf7ab32b914e7ff17, 0xbd2b8b3d59a0c463,
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0xbc9f816f7196b7d0, 0xbb748f89ebe0d605, 0xdcd178378ec59bc6, 0x53a1dbbf7b84364a,
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0x12b470a2c1665e73, 0x1a13ed19c750352d, 0x93547a8557eef29c, 0x8cfe2aa5c0e3625c,
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0x3411f094aed9b84c, 0xfd48ec6d265a07ac, 0x47b5ba30d3f53360, 0x5d4586efc824164d,
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0x2f02646af4c304d8, 0x9029611bf9d7510f, 0xf346390e1c7dbee8, 0xf64ee5b03f235f21,
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]);
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// ── Feistel state ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
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struct FeistelState {
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state: u32,
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counter: u32,
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}
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impl FeistelState {
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fn new() -> Self {
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Self { state: 0, counter: 0 }
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}
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/// Advance Feistel state. Verified against disasm @ 0x8004d4c1 State '\0'.
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///
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/// tmp = state ^ counter
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/// new_state = tmp + (ROL32(counter + state, state & 0x1F) ^ ROL32(tmp, counter & 0x1F))
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/// counter += 1
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fn advance(&mut self) {
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let counter = self.counter;
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let state = self.state;
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self.counter = counter.wrapping_add(1);
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let tmp = state ^ counter;
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let rol_a = counter.wrapping_add(state).rotate_left(state & 0x1F);
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let rol_b = tmp.rotate_left(counter & 0x1F);
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self.state = tmp.wrapping_add(rol_a ^ rol_b);
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}
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}
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// ── Single-byte decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Decrypt one byte from encrypted payload.
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///
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/// raw_byte: the encrypted input byte
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/// byte_counter: pre-increment counter (0 for first byte)
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/// feistel: mutable Feistel state (advanced each call)
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///
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/// Returns the decrypted byte.
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fn decrypt_byte(raw_byte: u8, byte_counter: u32, feistel: &mut FeistelState) -> u8 {
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// 1. Advance Feistel state
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feistel.advance();
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let st = feistel.state; // new state after advance
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// 2. S-Box A lookups on byte_counter (4 byte lanes)
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let b3 = SBOX_A_FWD[SBOX_A_INV[(byte_counter >> 24) as usize] as usize];
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let b2 = SBOX_A_FWD[SBOX_A_INV[((byte_counter >> 16) & 0xFF) as usize] as usize];
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let b0 = SBOX_A_FWD[SBOX_A_INV[(byte_counter & 0xFF) as usize] as usize];
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let b1 = SBOX_A_FWD[SBOX_A_INV[((byte_counter >> 8) & 0xFF) as usize] as usize];
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// 3. S-Box B key byte from rotated KEY_CONST
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let key_idx = (KEY_CONST.rotate_right(st & 0x1F) >> 56) as u8;
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let key_byte = SBOX_B_FWD[SBOX_B_INV[key_idx as usize] as usize];
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// 4. Combined shift derivation
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let combined: u64 = (b0 as u64)
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| ((b1 as u64) << 8)
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| ((b2 as u64) << 16)
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| ((b3 as u64) << 24)
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| 0xacacacac_00000000u64;
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// Arithmetic right shift (sign bit is 1 due to 0xac... in high bytes)
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let shift = (((combined as i64) >> (raw_byte as u32 & 0x1f)) & 0x1f) as u32;
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// 5. Mix: key_byte ^ ROL64(MIX_CONST, shift)[31:0] ^ FINAL_XOR
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let rotated = MIX_CONST.rotate_left(shift) as u32;
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let mixed = (key_byte as u32) ^ rotated ^ FINAL_XOR;
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// 6. Polynomial hash → output byte
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polynomial_mix(raw_byte as u32, byte_counter, st, mixed)
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}
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// ── Polynomial anti-tamper hash ─────────────────────────────────────
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// Faithfully translated from decompilation. All arithmetic is wrapping u32.
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fn polynomial_mix(raw: u32, n: u32, st: u32, mix: u32) -> u8 {
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let w = |a: u32, b: u32| -> u32 { a.wrapping_mul(b) };
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let wa = |a: u32, b: u32| -> u32 { a.wrapping_add(b) };
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// Derived values
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let shl12 = n << 12;
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let nshl12 = !shl12;
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let g = raw | !st; // uVar16
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let h = mix | shl12; // uVar22 (reused)
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let nn = !n; // uVar31
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let j = n ^ nshl12; // uVar25 (reused)
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let k = (n | shl12) ^ nshl12; // uVar26 (reused)
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let l = st & !raw; // uVar21 (reused)
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// Linear factors
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let f7 = w(j, 0x6b00ec19_u32);
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let f6 = w(k, 0x7ce3eb82_u32);
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let f17 = w(raw, 0xb19d3cea_u32); // raw * (-0x4e62c316) as u32
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let f23 = wa(wa(
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w(j, 0x1a82aada_u32),
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w(nshl12, 0xe6b8ed78_u32)), // nshl12 * (-0x19471288)
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w(nn, 0x013b9852_u32));
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let f15 = wa(f17, f23);
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let f12 = wa(f15, w(k, 0xe441bcd4_u32)); // k * (-0x1bbe432c)
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let f11 = wa(w(st, 0x1a2900ca_u32), f12);
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let f13 = w(g, 0x612fbba4_u32);
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// f14 == f12 (algebraically identical, verified in report §5)
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let f10 = wa(wa(wa(
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w(mix, 0xfec467ae_u32), // mix * (-0x13b9852)
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f13), f12),
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w(st, 0x4e62c316_u32));
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let f8 = w(nshl12, 0xad1a3c4c_u32); // nshl12 * (-0x52e5c3b4)
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let f9 = w(nn, 0x181b2865_u32);
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let f5 = w(st, 0x2bb9fc31_u32);
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let f4 = w(st, 0xd44603ce_u32); // st * (-0x2bb9fc32)
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let f3 = w(g, 0x0dc3d04a_u32);
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let f2 = w(mix, 0x38473458_u32);
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let f1 = w(mix, 0xaf9da343_u32); // mix * (-0x50625cbd)
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let fh = w(h, 0x181b2865_u32);
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// Sum of squares * 0xEA
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let sq_sum = wa(wa(wa(wa(wa(wa(wa(wa(wa(wa(
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w(f8, f8), w(f9, f9)), w(raw, raw)), w(f7, f7)), w(f6, f6)),
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w(f5, f5)), w(f4, f4)), w(f3, f3)), w(f2, f2)), w(f1, f1)),
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w(fh, fh));
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let sq_term = w(sq_sum, 0xea_u32);
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// Cross terms
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let cross1 = w(w(f8, w(j, 0x1a82aada_u32)), 2); // iVar8 * j * 0x1a82aada * 2
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let cross2 = w(w(f7, f17), 2); // iVar7 * iVar17 * 2
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let cross3 = w(wa(w(wa(wa(raw, f8), f7), f9), w(raw, f8)), 0xd4); // ((raw+f8+f7)*f9 + raw*f8)*0xd4
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let cross4 = w(w(f6, f15), 2); // iVar6 * iVar15 * 2
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let cross5 = w(w(f12, f5), 2); // iVar12 * iVar5 * 2
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let cross6 = w(w(f11, f4), 2); // iVar11 * iVar4 * 2
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let cross7 = w(w(wa(w(st, 0x4e62c316_u32), f12), f3), 2); // (st*0x4e62c316 + f14) * f3 * 2
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let cross8 = w(w(f2, wa(wa(w(st, 0x4e62c316_u32), f12), f13)), 2); // f2*(st*0x4e62c316+f12+f13)*2
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let cross9 = w(w(wa(wa(wa(w(st, 0x3439c24c_u32), f11), f13), w(mix, 0x13527870_u32)), f1), 2);
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let cross10 = w(w(f10, fh), 2); // iVar10 * iVar23 * 2
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let cross11 = w(w(l, wa(f10, w(h, 0x013b9852_u32))), 0x98); // l*(iVar10+h*0x13b9852)*0x98
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// Quadratic self-term: (l * (-0x50386060) + 0x7c) * l
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let l_quad = w(wa(w(l, 0xafc79fa0_u32), 0x7c), l);
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// Final assembly
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let mut result: u32 = 0x455ae97d_u32; // constant base
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result = wa(result, w(j, 0xa211f9f5_u32)); // j * (-0x5dee060b)
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result = wa(result, w(st, 0x84a187c3_u32)); // st * (-0x7b5e783d)
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result = wa(result, l_quad);
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result = wa(result, w(mix, 0xa1a9cfef_u32)); // mix * (-0x5e563011)
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result = wa(result, w(wa(h, nn), 0x5e563111_u32)); // (h + nn) * 0x5e563111
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result = wa(result, sq_term);
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result = wa(result, w(nshl12, 0x336bfe1c_u32));
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result = wa(result, w(raw, 0x8fd1523d_u32)); // raw * (-0x702eadc3)
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result = wa(result, w(k, 0x88700dfa_u32)); // k * (-0x778ff206)
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result = wa(result, cross1);
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result = wa(result, cross2);
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result = wa(result, cross3);
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result = wa(result, cross4);
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result = wa(result, w(g, 0x1a7751a2_u32));
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result = wa(result, w(l, 0x3d99e8a0_u32));
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result = wa(result, cross5);
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result = wa(result, cross6);
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result = wa(result, cross7);
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result = wa(result, cross8);
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result = wa(result, cross9);
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result = wa(result, cross10);
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result = wa(result, cross11);
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||||||
|
result as u8 // low byte = decrypted output
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ── Public API ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Decrypt 33 bytes from the encrypted payload in `d`.
|
||||||
|
///
|
||||||
|
/// Returns (key_material[32], control_byte).
|
||||||
|
///
|
||||||
|
/// `data`: the full decoded d-field bytes (part 1, typically 203 bytes)
|
||||||
|
/// `skip`: number of bytes to skip before the 33-byte encrypted window
|
||||||
|
pub fn feistel_decrypt(data: &[u8], skip: usize) -> ([u8; 32], u8) {
|
||||||
|
let mut feistel = FeistelState::new();
|
||||||
|
let mut key_material = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let mut control = 0u8;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for i in 0..33 {
|
||||||
|
let raw = data[skip + i];
|
||||||
|
let decrypted = decrypt_byte(raw, i as u32, &mut feistel);
|
||||||
|
if i < 32 {
|
||||||
|
key_material[i] = decrypted;
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
control = decrypted;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(key_material, control)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -134,11 +134,13 @@ pub fn interleave_key_half(input: &[u32], output: &mut [u32]) {
|
|||||||
/// Reverse of pack_input: apply masks in reverse order (0x0F -> 0x33 -> 0x55).
|
/// Reverse of pack_input: apply masks in reverse order (0x0F -> 0x33 -> 0x55).
|
||||||
pub fn unpack_output(s: &[u32; 8], final_rk: &[u32; 8]) -> [u32; 8] {
|
pub fn unpack_output(s: &[u32; 8], final_rk: &[u32; 8]) -> [u32; 8] {
|
||||||
// XOR with final round keys first
|
// XOR with final round keys first
|
||||||
|
// Mapping from pack_input output indices:
|
||||||
|
// out7=a, out3=e, out5=c, out1=g, out6=b, out2=f, out4=d, out0=h
|
||||||
let mut a = s[7] ^ final_rk[7];
|
let mut a = s[7] ^ final_rk[7];
|
||||||
let mut b = s[6] ^ final_rk[6];
|
let mut b = s[6] ^ final_rk[6];
|
||||||
let mut c = s[5] ^ final_rk[5];
|
let mut c = s[5] ^ final_rk[5];
|
||||||
let mut d = s[3] ^ final_rk[3];
|
let mut d = s[4] ^ final_rk[4]; // out4 = d part
|
||||||
let mut e = s[4] ^ final_rk[4];
|
let mut e = s[3] ^ final_rk[3]; // out3 = e part
|
||||||
let mut f = s[2] ^ final_rk[2];
|
let mut f = s[2] ^ final_rk[2];
|
||||||
let mut g = s[1] ^ final_rk[1];
|
let mut g = s[1] ^ final_rk[1];
|
||||||
let mut h = s[0] ^ final_rk[0];
|
let mut h = s[0] ^ final_rk[0];
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ pub mod sbox;
|
|||||||
pub mod gift256;
|
pub mod gift256;
|
||||||
pub mod hash;
|
pub mod hash;
|
||||||
pub mod solver;
|
pub mod solver;
|
||||||
|
pub mod feistel;
|
||||||
|
|||||||
101
src/main.rs
101
src/main.rs
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|||||||
//! hCaptcha PoW solver CLI
|
//! hCaptcha PoW solver CLI
|
||||||
//! Parses JWT challenge -> calls solver -> outputs base64 nonce
|
//! Parses JWT challenge -> calls solver -> outputs base64 proof
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine};
|
use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine};
|
||||||
use serde::Deserialize;
|
use serde::Deserialize;
|
||||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ mod gift256;
|
|||||||
mod hash;
|
mod hash;
|
||||||
mod solver;
|
mod solver;
|
||||||
mod util;
|
mod util;
|
||||||
|
mod feistel;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||||
@@ -54,56 +55,78 @@ fn main() {
|
|||||||
println!("Expiration: {}", payload.e);
|
println!("Expiration: {}", payload.e);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// 3. Decode challenge data from `d` field
|
// 3. Decode challenge data from `d` field
|
||||||
let challenge_data = STANDARD.decode(&payload.d).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
|
// The `d` field is two concatenated base64 strings:
|
||||||
// Try with padding adjustment
|
// encrypted_payload (with = padding) + seed (no padding)
|
||||||
let padded = format!("{}==", payload.d.trim_end_matches('='));
|
// Split at the padding boundary and decode each part separately.
|
||||||
STANDARD.decode(&padded).expect("Invalid base64 in challenge data")
|
let challenge_data = if let Some(eq_pos) = payload.d.find('=') {
|
||||||
});
|
let split_pos = eq_pos + payload.d[eq_pos..].chars().take_while(|&c| c == '=').count();
|
||||||
|
let part1 = &payload.d[..split_pos];
|
||||||
|
let part2 = &payload.d[split_pos..];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
println!("Challenge data: {} bytes", challenge_data.len());
|
let mut data = STANDARD.decode(part1).expect("Invalid base64 in challenge part1");
|
||||||
|
if !part2.is_empty() {
|
||||||
|
let p2 = STANDARD.decode(part2).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
|
||||||
|
// part2 may lack padding — add it
|
||||||
|
let padded = format!("{}{}", part2, "=".repeat((4 - part2.len() % 4) % 4));
|
||||||
|
STANDARD.decode(&padded).expect("Invalid base64 in challenge part2")
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
data.extend_from_slice(&p2);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
data
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
STANDARD.decode(&payload.d).expect("Invalid base64 in challenge data")
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// 4. Parse challenge (needs at least 49 bytes: 32 key + 16 target + 1 extra)
|
// Split challenge_data into encrypted_payload (part1) and seed_bytes (part2)
|
||||||
if challenge_data.len() < 49 {
|
// Part1 = first decode (203 bytes), Part2 = second decode (12 bytes)
|
||||||
eprintln!("Challenge data too short: {} bytes (need >= 49)", challenge_data.len());
|
let (encrypted_payload, seed_bytes) = if let Some(eq_pos) = payload.d.find('=') {
|
||||||
|
let split_pos = eq_pos + payload.d[eq_pos..].chars().take_while(|&c| c == '=').count();
|
||||||
|
let part1_len = STANDARD.decode(&payload.d[..split_pos])
|
||||||
|
.expect("Invalid base64 in part1").len();
|
||||||
|
(&challenge_data[..part1_len], &challenge_data[part1_len..])
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
(challenge_data.as_slice(), &[] as &[u8])
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
println!("Encrypted payload: {} bytes, Seed: {} bytes", encrypted_payload.len(), seed_bytes.len());
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// 4. Feistel decrypt 33 bytes → 32 byte key + 1 byte control
|
||||||
|
if encrypted_payload.len() < 33 {
|
||||||
|
eprintln!("Encrypted payload too short: {} bytes (need >= 33)", encrypted_payload.len());
|
||||||
std::process::exit(1);
|
std::process::exit(1);
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let mut key_material = [0u8; 32];
|
let (key_material, control) = feistel::feistel_decrypt(encrypted_payload, 0);
|
||||||
key_material.copy_from_slice(&challenge_data[0..32]);
|
println!("Feistel decrypted: key[0..4]={:02x}{:02x}{:02x}{:02x}, control=0x{:02x}",
|
||||||
|
key_material[0], key_material[1], key_material[2], key_material[3], control);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let mut target_hash = [0u8; 16];
|
let difficulty = if payload.c > 0 { payload.c } else { 1000 };
|
||||||
target_hash.copy_from_slice(&challenge_data[32..48]);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let extra_byte = challenge_data[48];
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let challenge = solver::Challenge {
|
let challenge = solver::Challenge {
|
||||||
key_material,
|
key_material,
|
||||||
target_hash,
|
difficulty,
|
||||||
extra_byte,
|
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// 5. Solve
|
// 5. Derive PCG seed from seed_bytes (part2 of d)
|
||||||
let seed = std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
let seed = if seed_bytes.len() >= 8 {
|
||||||
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
u64::from_le_bytes([
|
||||||
.unwrap()
|
seed_bytes[0], seed_bytes[1], seed_bytes[2], seed_bytes[3],
|
||||||
.as_nanos() as u64;
|
seed_bytes[4], seed_bytes[5], seed_bytes[6], seed_bytes[7],
|
||||||
|
])
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
std::time::SystemTime::now()
|
||||||
|
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap()
|
||||||
|
.as_nanos() as u64
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let max_iter = if payload.c > 0 { payload.c } else { 1_000_000 };
|
println!("PCG seed: 0x{:016x}", seed);
|
||||||
|
println!("Running {} iterations...", difficulty);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
println!("Solving with max {} iterations...", max_iter);
|
let proof = solver::solve(&challenge, seed);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let solution = solver::solve(&challenge, max_iter, seed);
|
// 6. Output base64-encoded proof
|
||||||
|
let proof_b64 = STANDARD.encode(&proof);
|
||||||
// 6. Output
|
println!("Proof size: {} bytes ({} digests)", proof.len(), proof.len() / 16);
|
||||||
match solution {
|
println!("n={}", proof_b64);
|
||||||
Some(sol) => {
|
|
||||||
let nonce_b64 = STANDARD.encode(sol.nonce);
|
|
||||||
println!("Found solution in {} iterations", sol.iterations);
|
|
||||||
println!("n={}", nonce_b64);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
None => {
|
|
||||||
eprintln!("No solution found within {} iterations", max_iter);
|
|
||||||
std::process::exit(1);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,97 +1,75 @@
|
|||||||
//! Top-level PoW solver
|
//! Top-level PoW solver
|
||||||
//! Corresponds to pow_main_dispatch (Yb) solve path (0xABAB270C)
|
//! Corresponds to pow_main_dispatch (Yb) solve path (0xABAB270C)
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! The `n` value is NOT a single nonce — it's an accumulated Vec<u8> of
|
||||||
|
//! 16-byte hash digests, one per iteration. The full output is base64-encoded
|
||||||
|
//! and typically 20-40KB (1250-2500 iterations × 16 bytes).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
use crate::pcg::PcgRng;
|
use crate::pcg::PcgRng;
|
||||||
use crate::sbox::apply_polynomial_sbox;
|
use crate::sbox::apply_polynomial_sbox;
|
||||||
use crate::gift256;
|
use crate::gift256;
|
||||||
use crate::hash;
|
use crate::hash;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// PoW solution result
|
|
||||||
pub struct PowSolution {
|
|
||||||
pub nonce: [u8; 12],
|
|
||||||
pub iterations: u32,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// Challenge data parsed from JWT `d` field
|
/// Challenge data parsed from JWT `d` field
|
||||||
pub struct Challenge {
|
pub struct Challenge {
|
||||||
pub key_material: [u8; 32], // 32-byte key material (before S-Box)
|
pub key_material: [u8; 32], // 32-byte key material (before S-Box)
|
||||||
pub target_hash: [u8; 16], // 16-byte target hash
|
pub difficulty: u32, // iteration count (c field from JWT)
|
||||||
pub extra_byte: u8, // 33rd byte
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// Main solve function.
|
/// Solve the PoW challenge by accumulating digests.
|
||||||
///
|
///
|
||||||
/// Full flow:
|
/// Returns a Vec<u8> of concatenated 16-byte digests (one per iteration).
|
||||||
|
/// This is base64-encoded to produce the `n` value sent back to hCaptcha.
|
||||||
|
///
|
||||||
|
/// Full per-iteration flow (0xABAB270C path):
|
||||||
/// 1. PCG generates 12-byte nonce
|
/// 1. PCG generates 12-byte nonce
|
||||||
/// 2. S-Box polynomial substitution (32-byte key material)
|
/// 2. S-Box polynomial substitution on key material
|
||||||
/// 3. GIFT-256 key schedule -> 480 bytes round keys
|
/// 3. GIFT-256 key schedule → 120 u32 round keys
|
||||||
/// 4. MMO compression
|
/// 4. MMO compression → chaining value
|
||||||
/// 5. Assemble hash input: [nonce_u32_0, nonce_u32_1, nonce_u32_2, 0x01000000]
|
/// 5. GIFT-256 encrypt (nonce as plaintext input)
|
||||||
/// 6. GIFT-256 encrypt + hash_finalize -> 128-bit digest
|
/// 6. hash_finalize → 16-byte digest
|
||||||
/// 7. Constant-time 16-byte comparison
|
/// 7. Append digest to output accumulator
|
||||||
/// 8. Match -> return nonce; no match -> regenerate nonce
|
/// 8. Loop back to step 1 with next PCG nonce
|
||||||
pub fn solve(challenge: &Challenge, max_iterations: u32, seed: u64) -> Option<PowSolution> {
|
pub fn solve(challenge: &Challenge, seed: u64) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||||
let mut rng = PcgRng::new(seed);
|
let mut rng = PcgRng::new(seed);
|
||||||
|
let iterations = challenge.difficulty;
|
||||||
|
let mut output = Vec::with_capacity(iterations as usize * 16);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Pre-compute key schedule and MMO (these don't depend on the nonce)
|
// Pre-compute key schedule and MMO (invariant across iterations)
|
||||||
let mut key_data = challenge.key_material;
|
let mut key_data = challenge.key_material;
|
||||||
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut key_data);
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut key_data);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let round_keys = gift256::key_schedule::key_schedule(&key_data);
|
let round_keys = gift256::key_schedule::key_schedule(&key_data);
|
||||||
let mmo_state = hash::mmo::mmo_compress(&round_keys);
|
let mmo_state = hash::mmo::mmo_compress(&round_keys);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Initialize hash state from MMO output
|
for _iter in 0..iterations {
|
||||||
// The hash state is derived from the round keys + chaining value
|
|
||||||
let base_state = [0u32; 8];
|
|
||||||
// State initialized to zeros, will be populated by the hash process
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for iter in 0..max_iterations {
|
|
||||||
// 1. Generate 12-byte nonce
|
// 1. Generate 12-byte nonce
|
||||||
let nonce = rng.generate_nonce();
|
let nonce = rng.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// 2. Assemble hash input block
|
// 2. Assemble hash input block from nonce
|
||||||
let nonce_u32_0 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]]);
|
let nonce_u32_0 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]]);
|
||||||
let nonce_u32_1 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[4], nonce[5], nonce[6], nonce[7]]);
|
let nonce_u32_1 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[4], nonce[5], nonce[6], nonce[7]]);
|
||||||
let nonce_u32_2 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[8], nonce[9], nonce[10], nonce[11]]);
|
let nonce_u32_2 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[8], nonce[9], nonce[10], nonce[11]]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let hash_input = [nonce_u32_0, nonce_u32_1, nonce_u32_2, 0x01000000u32];
|
// 3. GIFT-256 encrypt (nonce words + padding as plaintext)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// 3. GIFT-256 encrypt
|
|
||||||
let encrypted = gift256::encrypt::encrypt(
|
let encrypted = gift256::encrypt::encrypt(
|
||||||
&[hash_input[0], hash_input[1], hash_input[2], hash_input[3], 0, 0, 0, 0],
|
&[nonce_u32_0, nonce_u32_1, nonce_u32_2, 0x01000000, 0, 0, 0, 0],
|
||||||
&round_keys,
|
&round_keys,
|
||||||
);
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// 4. Finalize hash
|
// 4. Build hash state from encrypted output
|
||||||
// Build state from encrypted output
|
let hash_state = encrypted;
|
||||||
let mut hash_state = base_state;
|
|
||||||
for i in 0..8 {
|
|
||||||
hash_state[i] = encrypted[i];
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// 5. Finalize hash → 16-byte digest
|
||||||
let digest = hash::finalize::finalize(
|
let digest = hash::finalize::finalize(
|
||||||
&hash_state,
|
&hash_state,
|
||||||
&mmo_state.chaining,
|
&mmo_state.chaining,
|
||||||
&nonce,
|
&nonce,
|
||||||
);
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// 5. Compare with target
|
// 6. Append 16-byte digest to output accumulator
|
||||||
if constant_time_eq(&digest, &challenge.target_hash) {
|
output.extend_from_slice(&digest);
|
||||||
return Some(PowSolution {
|
|
||||||
nonce,
|
|
||||||
iterations: iter + 1,
|
|
||||||
});
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
None
|
output
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// Constant-time comparison (16 bytes)
|
|
||||||
fn constant_time_eq(a: &[u8; 16], b: &[u8; 16]) -> bool {
|
|
||||||
let mut result = 0u8;
|
|
||||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
|
||||||
result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
result == 0
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
769
tests/integration.rs
Normal file
769
tests/integration.rs
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,769 @@
|
|||||||
|
//! Comprehensive test suite for the hCaptcha PoW solver
|
||||||
|
//!
|
||||||
|
//! Tests cover:
|
||||||
|
//! 1. Polynomial S-Box (all 256 entries)
|
||||||
|
//! 2. PCG-XSH-RR PRNG (known seed outputs)
|
||||||
|
//! 3. Util bit-manipulation functions
|
||||||
|
//! 4. GIFT-256 bitsliced S-Box properties
|
||||||
|
//! 5. GIFT-256 interleave round-trip
|
||||||
|
//! 6. GIFT-256 linear layer properties
|
||||||
|
//! 7. GIFT-256 key schedule structure
|
||||||
|
//! 8. GIFT-256 encrypt determinism
|
||||||
|
//! 9. Hash subsystem (GF multiply, inner_compress, finalize)
|
||||||
|
//! 10. End-to-end solver wiring
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::pcg::PcgRng;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::sbox::apply_polynomial_sbox;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::util::*;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::gift256::sbox::sbox_bitsliced;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::gift256::interleave::*;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::gift256::linear::*;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::gift256::key_schedule::key_schedule;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::gift256::encrypt::encrypt;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::hash::mmo::mmo_compress;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::hash::inner_compress::inner_compress;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::hash::message::process_message;
|
||||||
|
use hcaptcha_pow::hash::finalize::finalize;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 1. POLYNOMIAL S-BOX TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Full 256-entry reference table computed via Python:
|
||||||
|
/// S(x) = (192*x^6 + 224*x^5 + 120*x^4 + 200*x^3 + 150*x^2 + 65*x + 147) % 256
|
||||||
|
const EXPECTED_SBOX: [u8; 256] = [
|
||||||
|
0x93, 0x4A, 0x2D, 0x0C, 0xF7, 0x3E, 0x71, 0x60, 0x1B, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x74, 0xFF, 0x66, 0x39, 0x48,
|
||||||
|
0xA3, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0xDC, 0x07, 0x8E, 0x01, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x42, 0x05, 0x44, 0x0F, 0xB6, 0xC9, 0x18,
|
||||||
|
0xB3, 0xEA, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0x17, 0xDE, 0x91, 0x00, 0x3B, 0x92, 0x95, 0x14, 0x1F, 0x06, 0x59, 0xE8,
|
||||||
|
0xC3, 0x3A, 0xDD, 0x7C, 0x27, 0x2E, 0x21, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0xE2, 0x25, 0xE4, 0x2F, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xB8,
|
||||||
|
0xD3, 0x8A, 0x6D, 0x4C, 0x37, 0x7E, 0xB1, 0xA0, 0x5B, 0x32, 0xB5, 0xB4, 0x3F, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x88,
|
||||||
|
0xE3, 0xDA, 0xFD, 0x1C, 0x47, 0xCE, 0x41, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x82, 0x45, 0x84, 0x4F, 0xF6, 0x09, 0x58,
|
||||||
|
0xF3, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0xEC, 0x57, 0x1E, 0xD1, 0x40, 0x7B, 0xD2, 0xD5, 0x54, 0x5F, 0x46, 0x99, 0x28,
|
||||||
|
0x03, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x10, 0x8B, 0x22, 0x65, 0x24, 0x6F, 0x96, 0x29, 0xF8,
|
||||||
|
0x13, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xBE, 0xF1, 0xE0, 0x9B, 0x72, 0xF5, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0xE6, 0xB9, 0xC8,
|
||||||
|
0x23, 0x1A, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x0E, 0x81, 0xB0, 0xAB, 0xC2, 0x85, 0xC4, 0x8F, 0x36, 0x49, 0x98,
|
||||||
|
0x33, 0x6A, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x97, 0x5E, 0x11, 0x80, 0xBB, 0x12, 0x15, 0x94, 0x9F, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x68,
|
||||||
|
0x43, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xFC, 0xA7, 0xAE, 0xA1, 0x50, 0xCB, 0x62, 0xA5, 0x64, 0xAF, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x38,
|
||||||
|
0x53, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xCC, 0xB7, 0xFE, 0x31, 0x20, 0xDB, 0xB2, 0x35, 0x34, 0xBF, 0x26, 0xF9, 0x08,
|
||||||
|
0x63, 0x5A, 0x7D, 0x9C, 0xC7, 0x4E, 0xC1, 0xF0, 0xEB, 0x02, 0xC5, 0x04, 0xCF, 0x76, 0x89, 0xD8,
|
||||||
|
0x73, 0xAA, 0x0D, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0x51, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x52, 0x55, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0xC6, 0x19, 0xA8,
|
||||||
|
0x83, 0xFA, 0x9D, 0x3C, 0xE7, 0xEE, 0xE1, 0x90, 0x0B, 0xA2, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEF, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x78,
|
||||||
|
];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_sbox_all_256_entries() {
|
||||||
|
for x in 0u16..256 {
|
||||||
|
let mut buf = [x as u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut buf);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
buf[0], EXPECTED_SBOX[x as usize],
|
||||||
|
"S-Box mismatch at x={}: got 0x{:02X}, expected 0x{:02X}",
|
||||||
|
x, buf[0], EXPECTED_SBOX[x as usize]
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
// All 32 bytes should be identical since input was uniform
|
||||||
|
for i in 1..32 {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(buf[i], buf[0], "S-Box byte {} differs from byte 0 for input {}", i, x);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_sbox_specific_values() {
|
||||||
|
// S(0) = 147 = 0x93 (constant term)
|
||||||
|
let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut buf);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(buf[0], 0x93);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// S(1) = sum of all coefficients mod 256 = (192+224+120+200+150+65+147) % 256 = 74
|
||||||
|
let mut buf = [1u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut buf);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(buf[0], 0x4A);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// S(39) = 0x00 (a zero in the S-Box, found from lookup table)
|
||||||
|
let mut buf = [39u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut buf);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(buf[0], 0x00);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_sbox_mixed_input() {
|
||||||
|
let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
for i in 0..32 {
|
||||||
|
buf[i] = i as u8;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut buf);
|
||||||
|
for i in 0..32 {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(buf[i], EXPECTED_SBOX[i], "Mixed input mismatch at index {}", i);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 2. PCG-XSH-RR PRNG TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Reference outputs for seed=12345, computed from Python reference implementation
|
||||||
|
const PCG_EXPECTED_U32: [u32; 20] = [
|
||||||
|
0x68677495, 0xDB38677A, 0x01B8EF75, 0x0C0B2EEE,
|
||||||
|
0xDBFB70E6, 0x92DDB8F5, 0xF84CD5BF, 0xA8C5D0DB,
|
||||||
|
0xAE1E7AF5, 0x5CD5DB6A, 0x65971E61, 0x630A3794,
|
||||||
|
0xF03DB558, 0xEBC6D353, 0x7C856CD9, 0x2FFCC414,
|
||||||
|
0x27170096, 0x0044E9A0, 0xF69DE00C, 0x64A78FFD,
|
||||||
|
];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const PCG_EXPECTED_NONCE: [u8; 12] = [149, 122, 117, 238, 230, 245, 191, 219, 245, 106, 97, 148];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pcg_nonce_seed_12345() {
|
||||||
|
let mut rng = PcgRng::new(12345);
|
||||||
|
let nonce = rng.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
nonce, PCG_EXPECTED_NONCE,
|
||||||
|
"PCG nonce mismatch for seed=12345\ngot: {:?}\nexpected: {:?}",
|
||||||
|
nonce, PCG_EXPECTED_NONCE
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pcg_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
// Same seed must produce same sequence
|
||||||
|
let mut rng1 = PcgRng::new(42);
|
||||||
|
let mut rng2 = PcgRng::new(42);
|
||||||
|
let n1 = rng1.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
let n2 = rng2.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(n1, n2, "PCG is not deterministic for same seed");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pcg_different_seeds_differ() {
|
||||||
|
let mut rng1 = PcgRng::new(0);
|
||||||
|
let mut rng2 = PcgRng::new(1);
|
||||||
|
let n1 = rng1.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
let n2 = rng2.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(n1, n2, "Different seeds should produce different nonces");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pcg_consecutive_nonces_differ() {
|
||||||
|
let mut rng = PcgRng::new(999);
|
||||||
|
let n1 = rng.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
let n2 = rng.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(n1, n2, "Consecutive nonces should differ");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 3. UTIL BIT-MANIPULATION TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_ror32() {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ror32(0x80000000, 1), 0x40000000);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ror32(0x00000001, 1), 0x80000000);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ror32(0x12345678, 0), 0x12345678);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ror32(0x12345678, 32), 0x12345678);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ror32(0x12345678, 8), 0x78123456);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_rol32() {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(rol32(0x80000000, 1), 0x00000001);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(rol32(0x00000001, 1), 0x00000002);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(rol32(0x12345678, 0), 0x12345678);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(rol32(0x12345678, 8), 0x34567812);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_bswap32() {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bswap32(0x12345678), 0x78563412);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bswap32(0x00000000), 0x00000000);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bswap32(0xFFFFFFFF), 0xFFFFFFFF);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bswap32(0x000000FF), 0xFF000000);
|
||||||
|
// Double swap is identity
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bswap32(bswap32(0xDEADBEEF)), 0xDEADBEEF);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_bitrev32() {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bitrev32(0x00000001), 0x80000000);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bitrev32(0x80000000), 0x00000001);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bitrev32(0x00000000), 0x00000000);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bitrev32(0xFFFFFFFF), 0xFFFFFFFF);
|
||||||
|
// Double reversal is identity
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bitrev32(bitrev32(0xDEADBEEF)), 0xDEADBEEF);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bitrev32(bitrev32(0x12345678)), 0x12345678);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_partial_bitrev_shr1_differs_from_bitrev() {
|
||||||
|
// partial_bitrev_shr1 uses mask 0x55555554 instead of 0x55555555 then >>1
|
||||||
|
// It should NOT be equal to bitrev32(x) >> 1 for most inputs
|
||||||
|
let x = 0xDEADBEEF;
|
||||||
|
let pbr = partial_bitrev_shr1(x);
|
||||||
|
let br_shr = bitrev32(x) >> 1;
|
||||||
|
// They may or may not match depending on the input, but the operation itself is valid
|
||||||
|
// Just verify it's deterministic
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(partial_bitrev_shr1(x), pbr);
|
||||||
|
// And not always zero
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(partial_bitrev_shr1(0x12345678), 0);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_nibble_half_swap() {
|
||||||
|
// Test identity: nibble_half_swap is an involution? Let's check.
|
||||||
|
let x = 0x12345678u32;
|
||||||
|
let swapped = nibble_half_swap(x);
|
||||||
|
// Not an identity
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(swapped, x);
|
||||||
|
// Verify the formula: (x.rol(12) & 0x0F0F0F0F) | (x.rol(20) & 0xF0F0F0F0)
|
||||||
|
let expected = (x.rotate_left(12) & 0x0F0F0F0F) | (x.rotate_left(20) & 0xF0F0F0F0);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(swapped, expected);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Zero in, zero out
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(nibble_half_swap(0), 0);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 4. GIFT-256 BITSLICED S-BOX TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_bitsliced_sbox_all_zeros() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
sbox_bitsliced(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
// All-zero input should produce a deterministic non-zero output
|
||||||
|
// (the S-Box is not the identity)
|
||||||
|
// Just check it doesn't crash and produces something
|
||||||
|
let is_all_zero = s.iter().all(|&x| x == 0);
|
||||||
|
// S-Box of all zeros is unlikely to be all zeros
|
||||||
|
// (depends on the Boolean function, but let's at least test it runs)
|
||||||
|
let _ = is_all_zero; // may or may not be zero
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_bitsliced_sbox_all_ones() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s = [0xFFFFFFFFu32; 8];
|
||||||
|
sbox_bitsliced(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
// Should produce some output without panicking
|
||||||
|
assert!(true, "S-Box on all-ones completed");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_bitsliced_sbox_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x12345678, 0x9ABCDEF0, 0x13579BDF, 0x2468ACE0,
|
||||||
|
0xFEDCBA98, 0x76543210, 0xECA86420, 0xFDB97531];
|
||||||
|
let mut s1 = input;
|
||||||
|
let mut s2 = input;
|
||||||
|
sbox_bitsliced(&mut s1);
|
||||||
|
sbox_bitsliced(&mut s2);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s1, s2, "Bitsliced S-Box must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_bitsliced_sbox_not_identity() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x12345678, 0x9ABCDEF0, 0x13579BDF, 0x2468ACE0,
|
||||||
|
0xFEDCBA98, 0x76543210, 0xECA86420, 0xFDB97531];
|
||||||
|
let mut s = input;
|
||||||
|
sbox_bitsliced(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(s, input, "S-Box should not be the identity function");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_bitsliced_sbox_not_involution() {
|
||||||
|
// Applying S-Box twice should NOT return the original (it's not an involution)
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x11111111, 0x22222222, 0x33333333, 0x44444444,
|
||||||
|
0x55555555, 0x66666666, 0x77777777, 0x88888888];
|
||||||
|
let mut s = input;
|
||||||
|
sbox_bitsliced(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
let after_one = s;
|
||||||
|
sbox_bitsliced(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
// Double application likely doesn't return to original
|
||||||
|
// (this is a property test, not a guarantee for all inputs)
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(s, input, "S-Box should not be an involution for this input");
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(s, after_one, "Double S-Box should differ from single");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 5. GIFT-256 INTERLEAVE TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_nibble_deinterleave_zero() {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(nibble_deinterleave(0), 0);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_nibble_deinterleave_all_ones() {
|
||||||
|
let result = nibble_deinterleave(0xFFFFFFFF);
|
||||||
|
// Should produce a valid result
|
||||||
|
let _ = result;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_key_deinterleave_functions_zero() {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(key_deinterleave_a(0), 0);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(key_deinterleave_b(0), 0);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(key_deinterleave_c(0), 0);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pack_input_all_zeros() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let rk = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let result = pack_input(&input, &rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(result, [0u32; 8], "Pack of zeros with zero keys should be zero");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pack_unpack_roundtrip() {
|
||||||
|
// pack then unpack with zero keys should be a round-trip
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x11111111, 0x22222222, 0x33333333, 0x44444444,
|
||||||
|
0x55555555, 0x66666666, 0x77777777, 0x88888888];
|
||||||
|
let zero_rk = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let packed = pack_input(&input, &zero_rk);
|
||||||
|
let unpacked = unpack_output(&packed, &zero_rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
unpacked, input,
|
||||||
|
"Pack/unpack round-trip failed\noriginal: {:08X?}\nunpacked: {:08X?}",
|
||||||
|
input, unpacked
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pack_unpack_roundtrip_random() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0xDEADBEEF, 0xCAFEBABE, 0x12345678, 0x9ABCDEF0,
|
||||||
|
0xFEDCBA98, 0x76543210, 0xAAAAAAAA, 0x55555555];
|
||||||
|
let zero_rk = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let packed = pack_input(&input, &zero_rk);
|
||||||
|
let unpacked = unpack_output(&packed, &zero_rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
unpacked, input,
|
||||||
|
"Pack/unpack round-trip with random data failed"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_pack_unpack_with_keys() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x11223344, 0x55667788, 0x99AABBCC, 0xDDEEFF00,
|
||||||
|
0x01020304, 0x05060708, 0x090A0B0C, 0x0D0E0F10];
|
||||||
|
let rk = [0xAAAAAAAA, 0xBBBBBBBB, 0xCCCCCCCC, 0xDDDDDDDD,
|
||||||
|
0xEEEEEEEE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x11111111, 0x22222222];
|
||||||
|
let packed = pack_input(&input, &rk);
|
||||||
|
let unpacked = unpack_output(&packed, &rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
unpacked, input,
|
||||||
|
"Pack/unpack with non-zero keys round-trip failed"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 6. GIFT-256 LINEAR LAYER TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_linear_p1_all_zeros() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
linear_p1(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s, [0u32; 8], "P1 of all zeros should be all zeros");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_linear_p2_all_zeros() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
linear_p2(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s, [0u32; 8], "P2 of all zeros should be all zeros");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_diffusion_a_all_zeros() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let rk = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
diffusion_a(&mut s, &rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s, [0u32; 8], "DA of all zeros with zero keys should be all zeros");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_diffusion_b_all_zeros() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let rk = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
diffusion_b(&mut s, &rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s, [0u32; 8], "DB of all zeros with zero keys should be all zeros");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_linear_p1_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x12345678, 0x9ABCDEF0, 0x13579BDF, 0x2468ACE0,
|
||||||
|
0xFEDCBA98, 0x76543210, 0xECA86420, 0xFDB97531];
|
||||||
|
let mut s1 = input;
|
||||||
|
let mut s2 = input;
|
||||||
|
linear_p1(&mut s1);
|
||||||
|
linear_p1(&mut s2);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s1, s2, "P1 must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_linear_p2_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x12345678, 0x9ABCDEF0, 0x13579BDF, 0x2468ACE0,
|
||||||
|
0xFEDCBA98, 0x76543210, 0xECA86420, 0xFDB97531];
|
||||||
|
let mut s1 = input;
|
||||||
|
let mut s2 = input;
|
||||||
|
linear_p2(&mut s1);
|
||||||
|
linear_p2(&mut s2);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s1, s2, "P2 must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_linear_p1_not_identity() {
|
||||||
|
let input = [0x12345678, 0x9ABCDEF0, 0x13579BDF, 0x2468ACE0,
|
||||||
|
0xFEDCBA98, 0x76543210, 0xECA86420, 0xFDB97531];
|
||||||
|
let mut s = input;
|
||||||
|
linear_p1(&mut s);
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(s, input, "P1 should not be the identity");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 7. GIFT-256 KEY SCHEDULE TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_key_schedule_zero_key() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let ks = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
// Should produce 120 u32 values without panicking
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ks.len(), 120);
|
||||||
|
// Zero key should still produce non-zero round keys (due to NOT compensation)
|
||||||
|
let has_nonzero = ks.iter().any(|&x| x != 0);
|
||||||
|
assert!(has_nonzero, "Zero key should produce non-zero round keys (NOT compensation)");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_key_schedule_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0x42u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let ks1 = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
let ks2 = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ks1, ks2, "Key schedule must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_key_schedule_different_keys_differ() {
|
||||||
|
let key1 = [0x00u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let key2 = [0x01u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let ks1 = key_schedule(&key1);
|
||||||
|
let ks2 = key_schedule(&key2);
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(ks1, ks2, "Different keys should produce different round keys");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_key_schedule_avalanche() {
|
||||||
|
// Flipping one bit in the key should change many round key words
|
||||||
|
let mut key1 = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let mut key2 = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
key2[0] = 0x01; // flip one bit
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let ks1 = key_schedule(&key1);
|
||||||
|
let ks2 = key_schedule(&key2);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let diff_count = ks1.iter().zip(ks2.iter()).filter(|(&a, &b)| a != b).count();
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
diff_count > 10,
|
||||||
|
"Single bit flip should cause avalanche effect, only {} of 120 words differ",
|
||||||
|
diff_count
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 8. GIFT-256 ENCRYPT TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_encrypt_zero_plaintext_zero_key() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
let plaintext = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let ciphertext = encrypt(&plaintext, &rk);
|
||||||
|
// Should produce non-zero ciphertext
|
||||||
|
let is_all_zero = ciphertext.iter().all(|&x| x == 0);
|
||||||
|
assert!(!is_all_zero, "Encryption of zeros with zero key should not be all zeros");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_encrypt_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0xABu8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
let plaintext = [0x12345678, 0x9ABCDEF0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0];
|
||||||
|
let ct1 = encrypt(&plaintext, &rk);
|
||||||
|
let ct2 = encrypt(&plaintext, &rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(ct1, ct2, "Encryption must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_encrypt_different_plaintexts_differ() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
let pt1 = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let mut pt2 = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
pt2[0] = 1;
|
||||||
|
let ct1 = encrypt(&pt1, &rk);
|
||||||
|
let ct2 = encrypt(&pt2, &rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(ct1, ct2, "Different plaintexts should produce different ciphertexts");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_encrypt_different_keys_differ() {
|
||||||
|
let key1 = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let key2 = [0x01u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let rk1 = key_schedule(&key1);
|
||||||
|
let rk2 = key_schedule(&key2);
|
||||||
|
let pt = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let ct1 = encrypt(&pt, &rk1);
|
||||||
|
let ct2 = encrypt(&pt, &rk2);
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(ct1, ct2, "Different keys should produce different ciphertexts");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_encrypt_plaintext_avalanche() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
let pt1 = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let mut pt2 = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
pt2[0] = 1; // single bit flip
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let ct1 = encrypt(&pt1, &rk);
|
||||||
|
let ct2 = encrypt(&pt2, &rk);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Count differing bits across all 8 words
|
||||||
|
let diff_bits: u32 = ct1.iter().zip(ct2.iter())
|
||||||
|
.map(|(&a, &b)| (a ^ b).count_ones())
|
||||||
|
.sum();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Good diffusion should flip roughly half the bits (128 out of 256)
|
||||||
|
// Allow wide range for a non-standard cipher
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
diff_bits > 30,
|
||||||
|
"Single bit change should cause significant diffusion, only {} bits differ",
|
||||||
|
diff_bits
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 9. HASH SUBSYSTEM TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_mmo_compress_zero_key() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
let state = mmo_compress(&rk);
|
||||||
|
// Chaining value should be non-zero (it's the GF(2^128) double of ciphertext extract)
|
||||||
|
let is_all_zero = state.chaining.iter().all(|&x| x == 0);
|
||||||
|
assert!(!is_all_zero, "MMO chaining of zero key should be non-zero");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_mmo_compress_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0xCDu8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key);
|
||||||
|
let s1 = mmo_compress(&rk);
|
||||||
|
let s2 = mmo_compress(&rk);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s1.chaining, s2.chaining, "MMO compress must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_inner_compress_all_zeros() {
|
||||||
|
let mut state = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let block = [0u32; 4];
|
||||||
|
inner_compress(&mut state, &block);
|
||||||
|
// XOR of zeros into zeros, then GF multiply with zeros = zeros
|
||||||
|
// So state should remain all zeros
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(state, [0u32; 8], "Inner compress of all zeros should be all zeros");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_inner_compress_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s1 = [0x11111111, 0x22222222, 0x33333333, 0x44444444,
|
||||||
|
0x55555555, 0x66666666, 0x77777777, 0x88888888];
|
||||||
|
let mut s2 = s1;
|
||||||
|
let block = [0xAAAAAAAA, 0xBBBBBBBB, 0xCCCCCCCC, 0xDDDDDDDD];
|
||||||
|
inner_compress(&mut s1, &block);
|
||||||
|
inner_compress(&mut s2, &block);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s1, s2, "Inner compress must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_inner_compress_feistel_structure() {
|
||||||
|
// After one round, the old left half should become the new right half
|
||||||
|
let state_init = [0x11111111, 0x22222222, 0x33333333, 0x44444444,
|
||||||
|
0x55555555, 0x66666666, 0x77777777, 0x88888888];
|
||||||
|
let mut state = state_init;
|
||||||
|
let block = [0xAAAAAAAA, 0xBBBBBBBB, 0xCCCCCCCC, 0xDDDDDDDD];
|
||||||
|
inner_compress(&mut state, &block);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Right half (state[4..7]) should be the old left half (state[0..3])
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(state[4], state_init[0], "Feistel: state[4] should be old state[0]");
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(state[5], state_init[1], "Feistel: state[5] should be old state[1]");
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(state[6], state_init[2], "Feistel: state[6] should be old state[2]");
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(state[7], state_init[3], "Feistel: state[7] should be old state[3]");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_process_message_empty() {
|
||||||
|
let mut state = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
process_message(&mut state, &[]);
|
||||||
|
// Empty message should not change state
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(state, [0u32; 8], "Empty message should not change state");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_process_message_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let mut s1 = [0x11111111u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let mut s2 = [0x11111111u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let msg = b"Hello, hCaptcha!";
|
||||||
|
process_message(&mut s1, msg);
|
||||||
|
process_message(&mut s2, msg);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(s1, s2, "Message processing must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_finalize_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
let state = [0x11111111, 0x22222222, 0x33333333, 0x44444444,
|
||||||
|
0x55555555, 0x66666666, 0x77777777, 0x88888888];
|
||||||
|
let chaining = [0xAAu8; 16];
|
||||||
|
let msg = b"test message";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let d1 = finalize(&state, &chaining, msg);
|
||||||
|
let d2 = finalize(&state, &chaining, msg);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(d1, d2, "Finalize must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_finalize_different_messages_differ() {
|
||||||
|
let state = [0x11111111, 0x22222222, 0x33333333, 0x44444444,
|
||||||
|
0x55555555, 0x66666666, 0x77777777, 0x88888888];
|
||||||
|
let chaining = [0xAAu8; 16];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let d1 = finalize(&state, &chaining, b"message A");
|
||||||
|
let d2 = finalize(&state, &chaining, b"message B");
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(d1, d2, "Different messages should produce different digests");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_finalize_different_chaining_differ() {
|
||||||
|
let state = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
let chaining1 = [0x00u8; 16];
|
||||||
|
let chaining2 = [0xFFu8; 16];
|
||||||
|
let msg = b"test";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let d1 = finalize(&state, &chaining1, msg);
|
||||||
|
let d2 = finalize(&state, &chaining2, msg);
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(d1, d2, "Different chaining values should produce different digests");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
// 10. END-TO-END INTEGRATION TESTS
|
||||||
|
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_full_pipeline_no_panic() {
|
||||||
|
// Verify the entire pipeline runs without panicking
|
||||||
|
let key = [0x42u8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let mut key_data = key;
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut key_data);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key_data);
|
||||||
|
let mmo = mmo_compress(&rk);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut rng = PcgRng::new(12345);
|
||||||
|
let nonce = rng.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_0 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]]);
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_1 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[4], nonce[5], nonce[6], nonce[7]]);
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_2 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[8], nonce[9], nonce[10], nonce[11]]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let encrypted = encrypt(
|
||||||
|
&[nonce_u32_0, nonce_u32_1, nonce_u32_2, 0x01000000, 0, 0, 0, 0],
|
||||||
|
&rk,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut hash_state = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
for i in 0..8 {
|
||||||
|
hash_state[i] = encrypted[i];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let digest = finalize(&hash_state, &mmo.chaining, &nonce);
|
||||||
|
// Digest should be 16 bytes, non-zero
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(digest.len(), 16);
|
||||||
|
let is_all_zero = digest.iter().all(|&x| x == 0);
|
||||||
|
assert!(!is_all_zero, "Full pipeline digest should not be all zeros");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_full_pipeline_deterministic() {
|
||||||
|
// Same inputs must produce same digest
|
||||||
|
let compute = || {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0xABu8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let mut key_data = key;
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut key_data);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key_data);
|
||||||
|
let mmo = mmo_compress(&rk);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut rng = PcgRng::new(42);
|
||||||
|
let nonce = rng.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_0 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]]);
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_1 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[4], nonce[5], nonce[6], nonce[7]]);
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_2 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[8], nonce[9], nonce[10], nonce[11]]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let encrypted = encrypt(
|
||||||
|
&[nonce_u32_0, nonce_u32_1, nonce_u32_2, 0x01000000, 0, 0, 0, 0],
|
||||||
|
&rk,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut hash_state = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
for i in 0..8 {
|
||||||
|
hash_state[i] = encrypted[i];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
finalize(&hash_state, &mmo.chaining, &nonce)
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let d1 = compute();
|
||||||
|
let d2 = compute();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(d1, d2, "Full pipeline must be deterministic");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn test_different_seeds_produce_different_digests() {
|
||||||
|
let key = [0xCDu8; 32];
|
||||||
|
let mut key_data = key;
|
||||||
|
apply_polynomial_sbox(&mut key_data);
|
||||||
|
let rk = key_schedule(&key_data);
|
||||||
|
let mmo = mmo_compress(&rk);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let compute_digest = |seed: u64| -> [u8; 16] {
|
||||||
|
let mut rng = PcgRng::new(seed);
|
||||||
|
let nonce = rng.generate_nonce();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_0 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]]);
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_1 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[4], nonce[5], nonce[6], nonce[7]]);
|
||||||
|
let nonce_u32_2 = u32::from_le_bytes([nonce[8], nonce[9], nonce[10], nonce[11]]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let encrypted = encrypt(
|
||||||
|
&[nonce_u32_0, nonce_u32_1, nonce_u32_2, 0x01000000, 0, 0, 0, 0],
|
||||||
|
&rk,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut hash_state = [0u32; 8];
|
||||||
|
for i in 0..8 {
|
||||||
|
hash_state[i] = encrypted[i];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
finalize(&hash_state, &mmo.chaining, &nonce)
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let d1 = compute_digest(111);
|
||||||
|
let d2 = compute_digest(222);
|
||||||
|
let d3 = compute_digest(333);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(d1, d2, "Different seeds should produce different digests");
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(d2, d3, "Different seeds should produce different digests");
|
||||||
|
assert_ne!(d1, d3, "Different seeds should produce different digests");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user